Bell's theorem rules out local hidden-variable theories. The locality condition is the demand that what an experimenter freely chooses to measure in one space-time region has no influence in a second spacetime region that is spacelike separated from the first. The hiddenvariable stipulation means that this demand is implemented through requirements on an assumed-to-exist substructure involving hidden variables. The question thus arises whether the locality condition itself fails, or only its implementation by means of the assumed hiddenvariable structure. This paper shows that any theory that satisfies two generally accepted features of orthodox quantum theory and that yields certain predictions of quantum theory cannot satisfy the aforementioned locality condition. These two features are that the choices made by the experimenters can be treated as localized free variables and that such free choices do not affect outcomes that have already occurred.
Introduction.
The premises of Bell's original hidden-variable theorem [1] postulate the existence of a substructure that determines in a local manner the outcomes of a set of alternative possible measurements at most one of which can actually be performed. The implementation of the locality condition in this way thus involves a technical "hidden-variable" assumption that goes beyond the locality condition itself. Consequently, Bell's proof of the inconsistency of this local hidden-variable assumption with certain predictions of quantum theory casts no serious doubt on the locality condition itslf: its implementation via the assumed hidden-variable substructure would appear to be the more likely cause of the derived inconsistency.
Bell [2] introduced later a seemingly weaker local hidden-variable assumption. However, this latter form can be shown [3, 4] to entail the original one, apart from errors that tend to zero as the number of experiments tends to infinity. Thus both forms of the hidden-variable assumption place strong conditions on the class of theories that are covered by the theorems. These conditions are essentially equivalent, logically, to the assumption that values can be pre-assigned conjunctively and locally to all of the outcomes of all of the alternative possible measurements. That assumption conflicts with what I believe to be the orthodox quantum philosophical attitude that one should not make any assumption that effectively postulates the existence of a well defined outcome of a localized measurement process that is not performed. Thus these hidden-variable theorems place in no serious jeopardy the underlying locality assumption that a free choice made by an experimenter in one space-time region has no influence in a second region that is space-like separated from the first.
The present paper shows that this locality assumption fails, however, not only under the hidden-variable assumption (or some closely related presumption that effectively ensures the existence, within the theory, of outcomes of unperformed local measurements) but also in a much larger class of theories, namely those that are compatible with the properties of Free Choice and No Backward-in-Time Influence on Observed Outcomes, and that yield certain predictions of quantum theory in experiments of the Hardy type [5] . The first two of these three properties are now described. Free Choices. For the purposes of understanding and applying quantum theory, the choice of which experiment is to be performed in a certain space-time region can be treated as an independent free variable localized in that region. Bohr repeatedly stressed the freedom of the experimenter to choose between alternative possible options. This availability of options is closely connected to his "complementarity" idea that the quantum state contains complementary kinds of information pertaining to the various alternative mutually exclusive experiments that might be chosen. Of course, no two mutually incompatible measurements can both be performed, and an outcome of an experiment can be specified only under the condition that that particular experiment be performed. No Backward-in-Time Influence. (NBITI) An outcome that has already been observed and recorded in some spacetime region at an earlier time can be considered fixed and settled, independently of which experiment a far-away experimenter will freely choose to perform at some later time. This assumption assigns no value to a local measurement except under the condition that this local measurement be performed. But any such locally observed value is asserted to be independent of which measurement will at some later time be freely chosen and performed in a spacelike separated region.
This NBITI assumption is required to hold in at least one Lorentz frame of reference, hence forth called LF.
This NBITI assumption is compatible with relativistic quantum field theory. In the Tomonaga-Schwinger [6, 7] formulation the evolving state is defined on a forward moving space-like surface. Their work shows that this surface can be defined in a continuum of ways without altering the predictions of the theory, so that no Lorentz frame is singled out as preferred. On the other hand, their formalism allows the quantum state to be defined by the constant time surfaces in any one single Lorentz frame that one wishes to choose, and shows that in this one frame the evolution, including all reductions associated with specific outcomes of measurements, proceeds forward in time, with a well defined past that is not influenced either by later free choices made by experimenters or by the outcomes of the later measurements.
This NBITI assumption is a small part of the larger locality condition in question here, which is the demand that what an experimenter freely chooses to do in one region has no effect in a second region that is spacelike separated from the first.
These definitions allow the following theorem to be stated: Theorem. Suppose a theory or model is compatible with the three premises: 1. Free Choices, which assert that the choice made in each region as to which experiment will be performed in that region can be treated as a localized free variable, 2. No Backward in Time Influence, which asserts that experimental outcomes that have already occurred in an earlier region (in frame LF) can be considered to be fixed and settled independently of which experiment will be chosen and performed later in a region spacelike separated from the first, and 3. For each of the alternative possible combinations of the free choices of which measurements will be performed in a Hardy-type experiment the predictions of quantum theory will hold under the condition that that combination is chosen.
Then this theory or model violates the following Locality Condition:
The free choice made in one region as to which measurement will be performed there has, within the theory, no influence in a second region that is spacelike separated from the first.
Proof of the Theorem.
The theorem refers to the following Hardy-type [5] experimental set-up. There are two experimental spacetime regions R and L, which are spacelike separated, with L lying earlier than R in LF. In region R there are two alternative possible measurements, R1 and R2. In region L there are two alternative possible measurements, L1 and L2. Each local experiment has two alternative possible outcomes, labelled by + and − .
The detectors are assumed to be 100% efficient, so that if a measurement is chosen in R then some outcome of that measurement, either + or −, will appear in R, and if a measurement is chosen in L then some outcome of that measurement, either + or −, will appear in L.
The three assumptions are implemented by asserting that: 1. For each of the two choices L1 or L2 available to the experimenter in L, and for each of the two alternative possible outcomes + or − of that experiment, there are instances in which that experiment, L1 or L2, is performed, that outcome, + or −, of that experiment appears, and an associated pair of options R1 and R2 exists, and 2. In each such instance the predictions of quantum theory hold if R1 is performed, and the predictions of quantum theory hold if R2 is performed.
These conditions can be formalized by defining an instance i to be a triad {X i , W i (R1), W i (R2)}, where X i is a possible outcome of a possible measurement in L, and W i (R1) is a possible world in which X i appears in L and R1 is performed in R, and similarly for R2, and then specifying that the predictions of quantum theory hold in W i (R1) and in W i (R2). This structure just expresses symbolically the theoretical idea that there are free choices in L as to which experiment is to be performed there, and for each such choice in region L two possible outcomes in L, and for each such possible outcome in L, two alternative options, R1 and R2, available to the experimenter in R, and that we are considering a theoretical structure that allows one to say, for each of these two options in R, that if that option is chosen then the corresponding predictions of quantum theory about outcomes in R will hold.
These assumptions are built into hidden-variable theories that reproduce the predictions of quantum theory, but the local hidden-variable theories have additional structure that is not entailed by the concept of an instance. This concept does not entail the existence of a well defined outcome of any unperformed local measurement unless that outcome is predicted with certainly (probability unity) under the specified conditions. And this concept leads to no contradiction with either the principles or the predictions of relativistic quantum field theory.
The first two pertinent predictions of QT for this Hardy setup are these(*):
For every instance i such that X i is a possible outcome of performing L1,
These two conditions immediately entail: Property 1. In every instance i such that X i is a possible outcome of performing L1:
Proof of Property 1. For every instance i such that X i is an outcome of performing L1, as specified in Property 1, either X i = − or X i = +. For instances i of the first kind prediction (2,1) ensures that the first alternative specified in Property 1 is satisfied. For instances i of the second kind prediction (2.2) ensures that the second alternative is satisfied. Q.E.D.
The second two pertinent predictions of QT for this Hardy setup are:
There are instances i such that X i is a possible outcome of performing L2 and (2.3): X i = − and the outcome + appears in R in W i (R2).
For every instance i such that X i is a possible outcome of performing L2, (2.4): If X i is − then outcome + appears in R in W i (R1).
These two conditions immediately entail:
Property 2. There are instances i such that X i is a possible outcome of performing L2, and Outcome + appears in R in W i (R1), AND Outcome + appears in R in W i (R2).
Proof of Property 2. Prediction (2.3) entails that there are instances i such that the second of the two conditions demanded by Property 2 is satisfied. Prediction (2.4) then ensures that for any of those instances i the first of the two conditions demanded by Property 2 is also satisfied. Q.E.D.
Properties 1 and 2 are incompatible with the locality condition that the choice between L1 and L2 has no influence in R. For under the condition that L2 is performed in L there are instances i that satisfy the condition on possible outcomes in region R that is specified in Property 2, whereas if L1 is performed in L then the condition on possible outcomes in R specified in Property 1 must hold. But these two conditions on possible outcomes in R are converse (exactly contradictory) conditions. This result that logically converse conditions on the possible outcomes in R hold according to whether L1 or L2 is freely chosen in L is a sufficient condition for the existence within the theory of an influence from L to R.
The Concept of Influence
It may be useful to discuss the concept of influence used here. I am adhering here to what I believe to be the "orthodox quantum philosophy." What I mean by this is that our physical theories are to be regarded as essentially rules that we use to make predictions about our future experiences on the basis of the information that we could get by performing possible measurements now. Thus the subject matter of both theoretical physics and the present study is the structure of such theories, and in particular the causal structure of such theories. The job of physics, proper, is not to speculate about the nature of some fundamentally unknowable ontological structure that might lie behind the empirical phenomena.
The purpose of a nonlocality theorem is to illuminate the causal structure of theories that reproduce the predictions of quantum theory and that conform to certain other conditions about the structure of the theory. The first of the other condition imposed here is the idea that choice of which of the two local measurements will be performed is to be treated as a free variable. I assume, in accordance with orthodox thinking, that only one choice is made in each region on any possible occasion. Hence we must go to the realm of theoretically possible worlds even to formulated the idea of nondependence on free choice. Theoretical physics has traditionally been recognized as dealing with a whole class of theoretically possible worlds, not merely with the one unique one of these possible worlds that we actually inhabit. Once the concept of free choice (hence possible worlds) is admitted one can consider the dependence of the truth of various statements upon these free choices.
The essential ingredient of any proof of the nonlocality property (i.e., the faster-than-light-influence or faster-than-light transfer of information property) is the tandem or simultaneous use of both of the two free variables: one can always accommodate the predictions of quantum theory by considering only one of the two free choices. What cannot be achieved is to demand no faster-than-light-influence in both directions. However, one can never empirically demonstrate the failure of the these joint no-faster-than-light conditions because one can always say that the condition fails in a option that is not performed. Thus the theorem does not assert that nature herself must involve faster-than-light action. It says rather that any theoretical conception of nature that reproduces the predictions of quantum theory, and the nobachward-in-time-influence condition, cannot be required to reproduce the predictions of quantum theory in both of the theoretically possible experiments between which the later experimenter is supposedly free to choose, without generating contradictory conditions in the later region under the two alternative possible condition between which the experimenter in the earlier spacelike separated earlier region is free to choose.
I have taken the necessary generation of contradictory conditions in the later region under the two alternative free choices made in the earlier region to be a sufficient condition for the existence of an influence in the later region of the choice made in the earlier region.
Conclusions
The conclusion obtained here about faster-than-light influences parallels Bohr's reply to the paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [8] . The assumption of those authors was that there was no faster-than-light influence of any kind. Bohr's response [9] was a partial denial of that assumption: he granted that there was no faster-than light "mechanical disturbance" , but noted that "there is an influence on the very conditions that define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system." A "mechanical disturbance" would be one capable of transmitting a signal, whereas the others pertain to "predictions", and hence to the theoretical structure, which from Bohr's point of view, was primarily a tool for making predictions. Bohr's conclusions about the existence of faster-than-light "influences", like the one deduced here, was made completely within the framework of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. But the focus of the present work is directly on the causal structure of possible theories, rather than on the issues of completeness and reality raised by the paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
All the assumptions of this nonlocality theorem are compatible with orthodox quantum philosophy, and the conclusion is compatible with relativistic quantum field theory. The theorem therefore covers orthodox quantum theory as a special case. No logical contradiction arises from our assumptions: the only conflict is with certain notions carried over, without any compelling rational or empirical reasons, from classical relativity theory.
The locality condition whose violation is demonstrated here is similar to the one occurring in Bell's theorems in that: (1), the dependence in question is on an experimenter's free choice of which measurement to perform in a certain region, and (2), the property that depends on this free choice depends jointly on both of the alternative possibilities between which the experimenter in the other region is free to choose. The present approach constructs the structure needed for the proof, namely the notion of instances, directly from the assumptions of Free Choice and No Backward in Time Influence, and then carries through the proof, without generating any contradiction with quantum theory, or using any combination of properties that are logically equivalent to Bell's hidden-variable assumptions. By dispensing in this way with the hidden-variable substructure the present theorem evades challenges to Bell's theorems of the kind that recently appeared in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science [10] . 
